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Abstract
In this paper we discuss two different criticisms of liberal democracy. By analyzing the con-
temporary Slovenian (radical) political thought of Žižek and some of his followers, which 
recently are revitalizing the “idea of Communism”, we first critically reflect upon the eman-
cipatory potential of this strand of contemporary Slovenian philosophy. The interlude fo-
cuses on the uses and logic of violence and pleads for a new politico-ethical culture of non-
violence. In the second part of the paper, by approaching Levinas’ ethical criticism of the 
liberal democracy and by focusing on his concept of a different temporality within political 
ethics, we discuss some alternative possibilities for the future progress of democracy.
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Introduction
After	 the	events	 (or	 the	event)	of	1989,	Europe	was	 faced	with	a	new	his-
torico-political	 constellation,	or	 a	promise,	 that	by	entering	 the	new	era	of	
democracy	the	citizens	of	ex-Communist	SE	and	Eastern	European	countries	
will	 experience	“the	 free	world,”	and,	 in	an	eschatological	 sense	and	 fully	
attuned	to	Fukuyama’s	famous	essay	from	1989,	that	the	same	citizens	will	
finally	seal	off	the	era	of	fear	and	political	insecurity.	After	only	two	years	
this	promise	was	already	radically	questioned	by	Alain	Badiou	in	his	book	Of 
an Obscure Disaster	(D’un désastre obscur)1	and	followed	by	philosophers	
like	Slavoj	Žižek,	by	calling	the	1989	events	with	the	designation	“obscure	
disaster.”	 Furthermore,	 by	 the	 same	 thinkers	 democracy	 has	 been	 called	 a	
“liberal	fundamentalism”2	and	high	hopes	of	the	promised	post-revolutionary	
era	of	 liberal	democracies	 too	quickly	seemed	 to	disappear.	Since	 then	 the	
question	of	politics	and	political	 theory	concentrates	around	 two	blocks	or	
1
Alain	 Badiou, D’un désastre obscur. Droit, 
Etat, Politique	 (La	 Tour	 d’Aigues:	 Editions	
de	 l’Aube,	 1991).	 Engl.	 and	Serbo-Croatian	
tr.	appeared	in	2009	under	the	title	Of an Ob-
scure Disaster: On the End of State-Truth,	
tr.	 by	Barbara	P.	Fulks	 (Maastricht:	 Jan	van	
Eyck	Akademie),	2009.
2
Slavoj	 Žižek,	 ed.,	 Revolution at the Gates. 
Žižek on Lenin: The 1917 Writings	(London	/	
New	York:	Verso,	2004),	p.	168.
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poles,	both	critical	of	democracy,	but	using	radically	different	vocabularies.	
The	first,	relatively	uniform	camp	of	thinkers	(for	example	Badiou,	Žižek	and	
others)	weaved	 its	new	 identity	around	 the	newly	 revived	 idea	of	 commu-
nism,	the	second	camp	aimed	at	reviving	and	rescuing	the	idea	and	promise	of	
democracy	(among	them	let	me	only	mention,	among	others,	Chantal	Mouffe,	
Jacques	Rancière	and	Jacques	Derrida).	Within	the	first	camp	we	even	face	the	
notion	of	an	eternal	recurrence	of	the	idea	of	violence	as	a	necessary	histori-
co-eschatological	event,	being	in	accordance	with	the	historical	intervention	
into	the	world	of	injustices	from	the	‘divine’	(Benjamin).	‘Divine	violence’	is	
therefore	identified	with	historical	phenomena	of	past	and	present,	and	with	
our	future	hopes:	according	to	Žižek	(in	his	book	Violence)	it	belongs	to	the	
mysterious	logic	of	Event	and	is	related	to	Love.3	I	believe	this	double recur-
rence	(of	the	ideas	of	communism	with	its	inherent	logic	of	violence	on	one	
side,	and	the	idea	of	democracy	on	the	other)	has	something	important	to	do	
with	the	radically	different	understandings	of	temporality	within	the	political	
(in	the	broad	sense)	as	well	as	with	its	inherent	relation	between	politics	and	
ethics.	I	intend,	first,	to	delineate	both	currents	of	thought	and,	in	a	conclu-
sion,	propose	the	ethical	criterion	for	democracy-to-come	(Derrida:	à-venir).
I The first recurrence: the idea of communism reclaimed
Let	us	begin	with	a	citation	from	an	influential	representative	in	contempo-
rary	Slovenian	philosophy.	The	excerpt	is	from	the	paper	called	“Communism	
between	Death	and	Resurrection”	and	addresses	Badiou’s	works	on	what	is	
now	known	as	a	“Communist	hypothesis:”
“To	insist	on	the	validity	of	the	Communist	hypothesis,	namely	to	consider	it	as	an	orientation	
spot	in	our	search	of	the	exit	or	in	our	attempt	of	breaking	it	with	existing	non-egalitarian	regi-
mes,	means	to	have	a	different	relationship	to	the	recent	more	or	less	unsuccessful	attempts	in	
enforcing	the	communist	hypothesis.	These	are	not	considered	as	the	evidence	for	the	hypothe-
sis’	invalidity,	but	as	the	inability	of	the	previous	figures	of	collective	subject	of	emancipation	
policy	to	enforce	the	hypothesis	successfully.	Again,	according	to	Badiou,	failure	in	proving	the	
Communist	hypothesis	does	not	mean	that	the	hypothesis	is	invalid,	but	that	the	collective	su-
bject	has	in	every	specific	situation	and	under	the	conditions	that	enable	the	hypothesis	to	exist	
in	such	situation,	when	facing	problems in	enforcing	the	Communist	hypothesis,	adopted	the	
wrong decision.	The	condition	for	the	productivity	of	failures	in	proving	the	hypothesis,	which	
retroactively,	after	the	hypothesis	is	proven,	turn	into	stages	on	the	path	to	the	solution	of	the	
hypothesis,	is	that	during	the	long-term	and	wearisome	search	for	the	solution,	the	hypothesis	is	
not	rejected,	but	is,	despite the series of failures,	preserved	as	the	regulative	idea	or	as	the	notion	
that	enables	the	mind	to	focus	on	searching	the	solution.”4
Before	analyzing	the	excerpt	allow	me	two	short	remarks.	First	about	the	title:	
it	clearly	brings	to	the	fore	two	faces	of	one	temporality	of	selves	–	namely,	
the	political	temporality	of	past	historical	events	(notably	past	emancipatory	
political	 acts	 from	1789	 to	1968)	which	at	 the	 same	moment	points	 to	 the	
future	of	 the	 idea	of	Communism	by	 infusing	 it	with	strong	eschatological	
meaning.	 It	 seems	 that	 this	 first	 temporality	bypasses	 the	 ethical	 as	 I	will	
explain	 and	 defend	 it	 in	my	 following	 analyses.	 Second,	 I	 understand	 the	
characterizing	of	 1989	with	 an	 “obscure	 disaster”	 as	 a	 sign	or	 an	 inherent	
paradox	of	the	politics/political	(I	do	not	want	to	refer	to	this	difference	here)	
as	understood	in	Western	tradition.	This	paradox	is	related	to	the	very	scheme	
of	 politics	 being	 understood	 either	 as	 a	Hegelo-Marxism,5	 or	 in	 a	 broader	
sense	of	Carl	Schmitt’s	concept	of	the	political.	If	there	is	a	way	toward	a	fu-
ture	culture	of	education for the politics of nonviolence	(as	I	will	call	it)	then	
it	is	necessary	to	follow	a	different	temporality	–	an	ethical	one	–	in	which	
our	 embodied	 selves	will	 acknowledge	 responsibility	 towards	 others	 as	 an	
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indispensable	element	of	any	political	gesture	of	the	past,	present	and	future.	
Nothing	less	than	a	new	theory	of	(inter)subjectivity	is	needed	for	this	to	be	
accomplished.
Now,	let	us	take	a	little	bit	closer	look	at	the	above	excerpt	and	its	context.	
What	strikes	me	in	this	particular	reading	of	Badiou,	is	the	talk	about	“prob-
lems”	 and	 “failures”	 in	 the	 course	 of	 historical	 attempts	 towards	 its	 reali-
zation.	By	putting	concrete	victims	of	 those	‘attempts’	 into	an	epoché,	 this	
thought	is	the	opposite	of	what	Jean-Luc	Nancy	understood	by	the	commu-
nity.	To	begin	from	the	beginning,	for	Nancy	(following	Bataille),	means	that	
a	radical	step	has	to	be	taken	to	bring	the	subject	to	the	first	ethical	gesture	
–	of	 one	 towards	 the	deceased	other	 –	 in	 our	 terms,	 to	 the	victim(s).	This	
is	the	first	and	preeminent	intrusion	of	the	other	into	the	temporality	of	the	
political.	It	is	from	here	that	the	rethinking	of	the	political	today	must	begin.	
Moreover,	Nancy	contends:	we	must	“allow	that	communism	can	no	longer	
be	the	unsurpassable	horizon	of	our	time.”6	Nancy	chooses	the	name	for	this	
community:	it	is	the	democracy.
Politics	for	both	Badiou	and	Žižek	must	be	a	part	of	the	procedure(s)	of	T/
truth.	Once	we	enter	this	plane,	serious	consequences	have	to	be	addressed.	In	
one	of	my	previous	analyzes	of	Badiou	and	Žižek	I	have	tried	to	discuss	the	
following	paragraph	from	Žižek’s	The Parallax View:
“…	 in	 contrast	 to	Nazism	and	American	capitalism,	 it	was	only	Soviet	Communism	which,	
despite	the	catastrophe	it	stands	for,	did	possess	true	inner	greatness	…	Here	we	should	follow	
Badiou,	who	claims	that,	despite	the	horrors	committed	on	its	behalf	(or,	rather,	on	behalf	of	the	
specific	form	of	these	horrors),	Stalinist	Communism	was	inherently	related	to	a	Truth-Event	
(of	the	October	Revolution)	while	Fascism	was	a	pseudo-event,	a	lie	in	the	guise	of	authenticity.	
Badiou	refers	here	to	the	difference	between	désastre	(the	Stalinist	‘ontologization’	of	the	Truth-
Event	into	a	positive	structure	of	Being)	and	désêtre	(the	Fascist	imitation	/	staging	of	a	pseudo-
event	called	‘Fascist	Revolution’):	mieux vaut un désastre qu’un désêtre	…	Stalinism	did	not	
sever	the	last	thread	that	linked	it	to	civilization.	The	lowest	Gulag	inmate	still	participated	in	
the	universal	Reason:	he	had	access	to	Truth	of	History.”7	
All	is	there:	Nazism,	(Capitalo-)Liberalism	and	Communism!	By	reading	both	
excerpts	together	I	think	we	can	already	understand	their	elemental	political	
constellation.	We	know	that	Badiou	claims	“that	communism is the right hy-
pothesis.”8	According	to	Žižek,	we	have	to	begin	from	the	beginning	–	i.e.	we	
3
Slavoj	Žižek,	Nasilje	 (Ljubljana:	Društvo	za	
teoretsko	 psihoanalizo,	 2007),	 p.	 169.	 For	
English	translation	see	Slavoj	Žižek,	Violence 
(London:	Profile	Books,	2008).
4
Jelica	 Šumič-Riha,	 “Komunizem	 med	 sm-
rtjo	 in	 vstajenjem,”	 [“Communism	 between	
Death	and	Resurrection”],	Filozofski vestnik,	
30:3	(2009),	pp.	75–107	(citation	on	p.	101;	
tr.	by	Tina	Čok:	my	emphases).
5
I	 refer	 here	 to	 an	 essay	of	Cornelius	Casto-
riadis	“Done	and	To	Be	Done”,	in:	David	A.	
Curtis,	ed.,	The Castoriadis Reader	(Oxford:	
Blackwell	 Publishers,	 1997),	 p.	 361:	 “The	
idea	that	an	ontology,	or	a	cosmology,	might	
be	able	to	save	the	revolution	belongs	to	He-
gelo-Marxism	–	that	is,	to	a	conception	as	far	
removed	as	possible	from	my	own.”
6
Jean-Luc	 Nancy,	 The Inoperative Commu-
nity,	 tr.	 P.	 Connor	 et	 al. (Minneapolis:	Uni-
versity	 of	Minnesota	 Press,	 1991),	 p.	 8.	On	
Nancy’s	community	see	my	“On	Progressive	
Alternative:	 Unger	 versus	 Žižek”, Synthesis 
philosophica, 25:1	(2010),	pp.	93–100.
7
Slavoj	Žižek,	The Parallax View	(Cambridge,	
Mass.:	MIT	Press,	2006),	pp.	285	f.	and	291.
8
Alain	 Badiou,	 The Meaning of Sarkozy	
(London:	Verso,	2008),	p.	97.	For	 the	Com-
munist	hypothesis	see	his	“L’hypothese	com-
muniste,”	Circonstances	 5	 (Paris:	Nouvelles	
Editions	Lignes,	2009),	pp.	181–205.
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have	“to	descend	to	the	starting	point	and	choose	a	different	path.”9	For	him,	
this	 return	 is	 closely	 related	 to	Lenin	and	 is	 characterized	by	paraphrasing	
Beckett’s	words	from	Worstward Ho:	“Try	again,	Fail	again.	Fail	better.”10	
Moreover,	for	Badiou,	without	the	hypothesis,	“it	 is	no	longer	worth	doing	
anything	at	all	in	the	field	of	collective	action	(…)	without	this	Idea,	nothing	
in	historical	and	political	becoming	is	of	any	interest	to	a	philosopher.”11	As	
the	above	excerpt	proves,	the	communist	hypothesis	should	be	presented	as	a	
regulative	idea,	but	Žižek	warns	us	against	such	a	Kantian	or	idealistic	read-
ing:	more	radically	and	more	concretely	even	than	Badiou,	Žižek	insists	on	
communism	as	a	movement,	reacting	to	different	social	antagonisms.	What	is	
returning	for	him	is	“Lenin”	as	a	signifier,	which	is	“transforming	a	series	of	
common	notions	into	a	subversive	theoretical	formation.”12	But	how	will	we	
react	to	those	social	antagonisms?	Žižek	basically	proposes	two	procedures:	
one	is	–	if	in	plain	vulgarity	I	only	repeat	after	him	–	“to	cut	the	balls”	of	our	
political	and	economic	leaders,13	the	second	is	by	staying	“passive”	in	regard	
to	the	different	“activities”	(such	as	intellectual	engagement,	public	discus-
sions,	political	activism	etc.).	But	in	this	“passivity”	we	are	already	close	to	
what	could	be	designated	with	the	Event:	in	this	mode	we	are	close	to	divine	
violence	understood	as	an	expression	of	transformative	love	which	mysteri-
ously	arises	in	the	course	of	history.	In	the	Interlude	I	wish	to	explore	some	
consequences	of	this	constellation.
Interlude: two remarks on the dissipation of violence
a. Counting the bodies
In	a	paper	of	Chomsky	(it	is	his	sharp	criticism	of	the	Courtois’	Black Book of 
Communism)	Chomsky	draws	on	Amartya	Sen’s	analyzes	of	the	1958–1961	
famine	in	China	and	endemic	undernutrition	in	India:14	according	to	Sen,	In-
dia’s	democracy	with	 its	free	press	and	open	public	discussion	was	able	 to	
prevent	catastrophic	famines	such	as	occurred	in	Maoist	China.	In	China	we	
talk	about	16,5–29,5	million	deaths	caused	by	communist	experiments	in	the	
50s	and	early	60s.	But,	as	Chomsky	observes,	toward	the	end	of	his	essay	Sen	
also	admits:
“Finally,	it	is	important	to	note	that	despite	the	gigantic	size	of	excess	mortality	in	the	Chinese	
famine,	the	extra	mortality	in	India	from	regular	deprivation	in	normal	times	vastly	oversha-
dows	the	former.	Comparing	India’s	death	rate	of	12	per	thousand	with	China	of	7	per	thousand,	
and	applying	that	difference	to	the	Indian	population	of	781	million	in	1986,	we	get	an	estimate	
of	excess	normal	mortality	in	India	of	3.9	million	per	year.	This	implies	that	every	eight	years	
or	so	more	people	die	in	India	because	of	its	higher	regular	death	rate	than	died	in	China	in	the	
gigantic	famine	of	1958–1961.	India	seems	to	manage	to	fill	its	cupboard	with	more	skeletons	
every	eight	years	that	China	put	there	in	its	years	of	shame.”15
This	opens	serious	ethico-political	questions	we	will	not	be	able	to	address	
here	 in	 their	 entirety.	But	 it	 is	 clear	 that	Chomsky	uses	Sen’s	 argument	 to	
present	the	relative	character	of	a	Maoist	experiment	(of	course	Stalinist	ter-
ror	 and	 catastrophic	 famine	 in	Ukraine	 of	 1932–33	 immediately	 comes	 to	
one’s	mind	with	its	6-10	million	deaths):	for	Chomsky,	then,	the	regular	death	
rate	in	India	in	its	years	after	independence	proves	that	more	people	died	in	
post	1950s	 India	 than	 in	 the	entire	course	of	 the	20th	Century	Communist	
experiment	(estimated	to	reach	100	million	since	1917).	Capitalism	and	de-
mocracy	cause	more	deaths	than	Communism.	I	am	convinced	that	Sen’s	in-
tention	was	not	to	point	to	this:	throughout	his	works,	Sen’s	arguments	stand	
for	democracy	and	its	progress	toward	more	freedom,	understood	in	a	sense	
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of	a	“capabilities	approach,”	as	proposed	by	him	and	later	by	Martha	Nuss-
baum.	The	basic	problem	I	see	in	Chomsky	is	that,	despite	his	insistence	that	
he	is	not	expressing	judgments,	he	is	bound	to	the	temporality	that	I	discussed	
earlier,	 i.e.,	 the	 recurrence	 of	 the	 political	 in	 a	 form	of	Badiou’s	 exclama-
tion	–	mieux vaut un désastre qu’un désêtre.	I	think	the	only	possible	way	of	
dealing	with	this	difficult	question,	and	perhaps	resolving	it	within	the	future	
culture	of	democracy,	is	through	reflection	on	violence	and	the	future	culture	
of	nonviolence.
b. Sorel’s Reflections on Violence
This	 brings	 us	 to	Georges	Sorel	 (1847–1922)	 and	 his	 book	Reflections on 
Violence.16	Sorel’s	philosophy	brings	many	 issues	 to	 the	board:	 they	 range	
from	ethics	to	political	struggles,	but	they	are	always	strongly	underlined	by	
his	idiosyncratic	notion	of	violence.	Let	us	first	say	that	violence	in	Sorel	is	
mainly	related	to	strikes.	Now,	Sorel’s	discussions	on	proletarian	strikes,	the	
revolutionary	tradition	in	France	and	Russia	(up	to	the	1917	events)	are	per-
haps	not	so	original.	Clearly	(and	rightly,	in	a	way)	he	is	convinced	that	prole-
tarian	violence	was	fully	in	line	with	the	historical	causes	of	the	revolutionary	
centuries.	But	when	discussing	the	very	nature	of	violence,	Sorel	was	willing	
“to	equate	it	with	life,	creativity	and	virtue.”17	This	deserves	a	more	profound	
exegesis	and	a	commentary.	Let	us	look	at	his	views:
“Not	only	can	proletarian	violence	ensure	the	future	revolution	but	it	also	seems	the	only	means	
by	which	the	European	nations,	stupefied	by	humanitarianism,	can	recover	their	former	energy	
(…)	Proletarian	violence	(…)	appears	thus	as	a	very	fine	and	heroic	thing;	it	is	at	the	service	of	
the	immemorial	interests	of	civilization;	it	is	not	perhaps	the	most	appropriate	method	of	obtai-
ning	immediate	material	advantages,	but	it	may	save	the	world	from	barbarism.	(…)	Proletarian	
acts	of	violence	(…)	are	purely	and	simply	acts	of	war	(…)	[e]verything	in	war	is	carried	out	
without	hatred	and	without	the	spirit	of	revenge;	in	war	the	vanquished	are	not	killed	(…)	force	
is	then	displayed	according	to	its	own	nature…”18
More	 importantly,	when	speaking	about	 the	contemporary	 ideals	of	educa-
tion,	Sorel	contends	in	the	chapter	“The	Ethics	of	Violence”:
	 9
Slavoj	Žižek,	“How	to	Begin	from	the	Begin-
ning,” New Left Review	57	(May–June	2009),	
pp.	43–55.	Cit.	on	p.	51.
10
Ibid.,	p.	45.
11
Cited	by	Žižek	in	ibid.,	p.	52.
12
Žižek,	Revolution at the Gates,	p.	312.
13
This	appears	in	Slovenian	version	of	his	essay	
“To	 Begin	 from	 the	 Beginning,”	 in:	 Slavoj	
Žižek,	Poskusiti znova – spodleteti bolje,	ed.	
by	P.	Klepec	(Ljubljana:	Cankarjeva	založba,	
2011),	p.	438.	
14
Noam	 Chomsky,	 “Counting	 the	 Bodies,”	
http://www.spectrezine.org/global/chomsky.
htm	(accessed	13/11/2011).	For	Sen	see:	Jean	
Dreze	and	Amartya	Sen,	“Hunger	and	Public	
Action,”	 in:	Niraja	Gopal	 Jayal,	 ed.,	Demo-
cracy in India	(New	Delhi:	Oxford	University	
Press,	2009),	pp.	311–326.
15
Dreze	and	Sen,	ibid.,	p.	321.
16
Georges	 Sorel,	 Reflections on Violence,	 ed.	
by	J.	Jennings	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	Uni-
versity	Press,	1999).	The	chapters	of	the	book	
originally	appeared	in	Italian	journal	Il Dive-
nire sociale	in	1905	and	1906	and	were	later	
published	in	a	book	in	1908.
17
Ibid.,	p.	xxi	(Editor’s	Introduction).
18
Ibid.,	pp.	78,	85	and	106.
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“There	are	so	many	legal	precautions	against	violence	and	our	education	is	directed	towards	so	
weakening	our	tendencies	toward	violence	that	we	are	intrinsically	inclined	to	think	that	any	act	
of	violence	is	a	manifestation	of	a	return	to	barbarism.”19
All	 this	 accounts	 for	 an	 effort	 of	Sorel	 to	 build	 an	 ethics,	 suitable	 to	 be	 a	
‘legitimate’	companion	of	the	inevitable	historical	process	of	class	struggle.	
I	strongly	believe	that	this	equation	of	violence	with	the	historical	necessities	
is	utterly	false	precisely	because	it	establishes	a	nonautonomous	subjectivity,	
subjected	 to	 the	 logic	 of	Hegelo-Marxism	 (this	 does	 not	mean	 that	Hegel	
cannot	be	read	differently	as	I	will	indicate	later).	Within	this	logic	only	the	
recurrence	of	political	in	the	sense	presented	by	Badiou,	Žižek	and	their	fol-
lowers	can	appear.
II The second or ethical recurrence: 
    on the vicissitudes of democracy
a. Levinas’s politics
In	 1934	 the	 young	 Levinas	wrote	 an	 important	 essay,	 “Reflections	 on	 the	
Philosophy	of	Hitlerism.”	With	its	elaboration	on	Nazism,	Communism	and	
Liberalism	it	is	fully	in	line	with	our	citation	from	Žižek.	But	the	essay	repre-
sents	an	idiosyncratic	analysis	of	the	political	philosophy	of	the	West,	point-
ing	 towards	what	I	will	 try	 to	present	as	a	recurrence	of	 the	ethical.	 In	 the	
main	question	from	his	prefatory	note,	written	in	1990,	Levinas	states	quite	
succinctly:
“We	must	ask	ourselves	if	liberalism	is	all	we	need	to	achieve	an	authentic	dignity	for	the	human	
subject	…	[L]iberalism	tends	to	place	the	human	spirit	on	a	plane	that	is	superior	to	reality.”20
Levinas	had	first	proposed	that	Marxism	was	the	first	doctrine	seriously	to	
break	this	line	of	thinking,	but,	more	importantly,	he	also	stated	in	this	essay	
that	it	was	our	task	to	replace	the	antagonism(s)	of	body	and	spirit	with	the	
new	experience	of	our	bodies.	But	I	find	Levinas’s	statement	that	“the	body	is	
closer	and	more	familiar	to	us	than	the	rest	of	the	world”21	as	a	signpost	to	the	
new	political	philosophy,	grounded	in	ethics	and	thus	toward	the	possibility	of	
new	political	ethics.	But	what	is	important	in	Levinas’	essay	for	our	context	is	
a	new	constellation	in	politics,	which	builds	on	a	(maternal)	non-expansion of 
force. For	Levinas,	liberalism	and	its	most	degenerative	form,	fascism,	have	
namely	both	been	rooted	in	the	ontology	of	being	and	on	the	will	to	power.	
This	is	why	he	talks	about	difficult	freedom,	beginning	anew	from	our	ethical	
responsibility,	grounded	in	our	bodies.	This	is	what	I	find	present	in	Nancy	
but	not	in	the	constellations	as	presented	in	the	first	part	of	this	paper.	But	how	
is	it	possible	to	pave	the	way	to	this	new	subjectivity,	drawing	on	ethical	tem-
porality	and	a	difficult	freedom,	one	different	from	political	freedoms?	For	
Levinas	it	requires	becoming	aware	of	this	‘bondage’	within	our	being.	But	
let	us	focus	on	the	core	of	Levinasian	politics:	for	him	politics	is	war.	This	is	
close	to	Sorel’s	elaboration	of	violence,	of	course.	But	this	violence	is	related	
to	something	more	important	–	our	logic	of	being	or	subjectivity.	Probably	the	
most	influential	Levinasian	scholar	today,	Enrique	Dussel,	succinctly	reports	
on	the	following	passage	from	Levinas:
“Does	not	lucidity,	the	mind’s	openness	upon	the	true,	consist	in	catching	sight	of	the	permanent	
possibility	of	war?	The	state	of	war	suspends	morality.”22
This	 structure	 of	 ontology	 (totality,	 the	Same,	Truth	–	 even	 the	 politics	 of	
Truth!)	does	not	permit	one,	and	this	is	even	less	possible	in	politics,	to	es-
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tablish	a	relation	toward	the	other	in	an	ethical	sense.	As	we	have	seen	in	our	
previous	analyses,	the	politics	of	Truth	and	the	related	logic	of	the	Event	does	
not	permit	one	to	establish	ethical	subjectivity,	based	on	responsibility	for	the	
other.	‘Truth’	and	‘event’,	in	politics,	both	put	subjectivity	–	through	divine	
violence,	or	‘Love,’	as	in	Žižek	–	into	an	ethical	epoché	and	thus	only	appar-
ently	break	the	ontological	necessity	inherited	from	the	past	and	now	trans-
ferred	to	the	future.	Difference	in	the	ethical	sense	is	not	established.	Victoria	
Tahmasebi	states	in	her	analysis	of	Levinas’	politics	the	following:
“Levinas	argues	 that	 in	 the	ethical	 relationship	a	 temporality	arises	 in	which	 the	dimensions	
of	the	past	and	the	future	have	their	own	signification	…	In	diachronic	or	ethical	time,	which	
Levinas	contrasts	to	the	time	of	essence,	the	future	is	not	an	event	already	awaiting	me	…	My	
explanation	for	the	other	requires	that	I	cross	the	threshold	of	linear	time	and	encounter	another	
modality	of	time,	for	even	though	I	did	not	participate	in	the	past	suffering	of	the	other,	I	am	still	
responsible	to	that	past.”23
This	is	diachronical	time,	contrasted	to	the	time	of	essence.	Levinas	has	in-
herited	 it	 from	Nietzsche’s	philosophy.	 I	argue	 that	 it	 is	precisely	here	 that	
a	possibility	of	new	political	ethics	resides.	In	the	first	part	of	this	paper	we	
have	called	this	the	intrusion	of	the	other	into	the	temporality	of	politics,	or	
into	 the	politics	of	Truth.	This	 intrusion	has	a	name:	ethical	 responsibility.	
This	 is	what	breaks	the	logic	of	presence/present,	 in	which	the	other	 is	 the	
means	for	the	same.24	If	we	follow	this	new	logic	further,	the	event	of	recur-
rence	occurs:	the	body	appearing	in	front	of	me,	with	its	heartbeat,	breathing	
–	all	this	testifies	to	a	different	temporality,	coming-to-be	in	front	of	me,	in	
every	moment.	Perhaps	this	is	the	truth	of	eternal	recurrence	in	Nietzsche.	In	
all	this	resides	the	first	break	with	the	Western	political	tradition,	residing	in	
contracts,	struggles	and	violence.	And	as	we	have	seen	earlier	it	is	Benjamin	
(and	after	him	Žižek)	 that	believes	 in	divine	violence.25	Divine	violence	 is	
“the	only	power	that	is	able	to	call	a	halt	to	the	war	of	all	against	all	or	to	stop	
pure	destruction”26	and	as	such	 it	 is	 the	only	educative	(sic!)	power	which	
expiates	without	guilt	or	retribution.	In	this	 light	of	 its	(also)	revolutionary	
potential,	as	Žižek	states	in	his	book	Violence,	the	commandment	“You	shall	
not	murder”	 is	 a	Kantian	 regulative	 idea.	Of	course	Žižek	 is	not	naïve:	he	
knows	perfectly	well	 that	 this	violence	does not	correspond	 to	any	histori-
cal	necessity,	as	understood	by	some	revolutionaries	or	totalitarian	regimes,	
or	individuals	in	the	service	of	an	idea.	Yet,	it	is	a	violence,	which	expiates	
as	a work of Love	of	a	subject.	For	Žižek,	following	Che	Guevara	and	Ki-
erkegaard’s	reading	of	the	commandment	“love	your	enemy,”	we	must	“love	
with	the	hatred.”27	Pure	violence	corresponds	to	pure	love.	But	to	conclude	
19
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this	part:	in	her	interpretation	of	Levinas,	Victoria	Tahmasebi	recalls	Levinas’	
words	 from	 one	 of	 his	 interviews:	 surprisingly	 it	 is	 Lenin,	which	 also	 for	
Levinas	could	testify	to	an	impossible	as	a	testimony	for	a	radical	break	in	our	
time.	Moreover,	she	interprets	Levinas’	modality	of	“beyond	being”	as	being	
structurally	identical	to	Benjamin’s	divine	violence	and	it	is	difficult	to	op-
pose	her	interpretation.	There	is	a	mysterious	ethical	limit	present	in	Levinas’	
notion	of	the	political.28
b. Towards the politics of nonviolence
Let	us	now	look	at	the	following	excerpt:
“Your	blood	has	been	split	in	Palestine	and	Iraq,	and	the	horrific	image	of	the	massacre	in	Qana	
in	Lebanon	is	still	fresh	in	people’s	minds.	The	massacres	that	have	taken	place	in	Tajikistan,	
Burma,	Kashmir,	Assam,	the	Philippines,	Fatani,	Ogadin,	Somalia,	Eritrea,	Chechnya	and	Bos-
nia	Herzegovina	send	shrivers	down	our	spines	and	stir	up	our	passions.”29
If	we	follow	the	logic	of	divine	violence	in	its	fullness,	is	this	then	a	‘legiti-
mate’	call	and	are	violent	acts	that	follow	from	it	therefore	justified?	Žižek	
affirms:	divine	violence	is	not	objective,	but	subjective	(does	not	Bin	Laden	
refer	to	his	emotions?),	it	is	historical	and	related	to	our	utmost	responsibility	
for	the	“just”	cause,	that	no	one	can	take	from	us	and	do	for	us,	then	those	sup-
pressed	by	divine	violence	are	guilty,	and	finally,	You shall not kill any person	
from	the	Koran	(17:33)	is	only	understood	as	Kantian	regulative	idea.	To kill 
a human being is not a crime.30
Perhaps	we	are	perplexed	now.	First,	to	be	clear:	I	agree	with	in	my	opinion	the	
most	important	Levinasian	and	neo-Marxian	philosopher	of	our	age,	Enrique	
Dussel,	when	he	writes	about	the	city	of	Babylon,	“whose	ruins	are	near	the	
present	Bagdad,	destroyed	by	the	barbarians	at	the	beginning	of	the	twentieth-
first	century.”31	But	I	think	we	can	find	an	answer	to	this	question	in	a	short	
but	 extremely	 important	 book	 Indignes vous!, a	 book	written	 by	Stephane	
Hessel:	in	this	important	book	Hessel	devotes	a	chapter	to	nonviolence	and	
his	vision	of	a	peaceful	coexistence	is	something	that	has	been	radically	for-
gotten	 in	 political	 theory	 of	 today.	 Referring	 to	 Sartre	 and	 his	 affirmative	
thoughts	on	terrorism	(according	to	Sartre	the	only	way	to	stop	violence	is	by	
being	violent)	–	Hessel	adds:	nonviolence	is	certainly	a	more	effective	way	
of	stopping	violence.32	In	the	concluding	part	of	this	paper	I	will	thus	argue	
that	it	is	only	within	the	culture	of	democracy	that	we	can	search	for	this	aim.	
We	have	seen	that	it	is	in	Levinas	that	the	first	intrusion	of	the	other	into	our	
world	has	happened.	This	must	now	be	developed	further	within	the	very	idea	
of	democracy	and	understood	as	its	emerging	ethical	core.
To	return	to	Hessel:	he	replaces	violence	with	hope.	This	is	a	very	important	
thought.	For	coming	 towards	education	 for	nonviolence,	and	 for	getting	 to	
the	 future	 culture	 of	 democracy,	we	must	 affirm	 that	 subjectivity	must	 be	
built	anew.	As	a	pragmatist	today	I	will	not	elaborate	on	Dewey’s	democratic	
ideal.	But	I	wish	to	note	that	his	idea	of	democracy	is	basically	what	I	find	to	
be	the	most	important	intervention	into	politics	after	Marx	and	is	of	course	
present	in	one	way	or	another	in	all	my	elaborations	on	democracy.	Dewey	
once	wrote	–	and	this	is	what	Hessel	wanted	to	say	in	his	chapter	on	a	peace-
ful	rebellion:
“To	take	as	far	as	possible	every	conflict	which	arises	…	out	of	the	atmosphere	and	medium	of	
force,	of	violence	as	a	means	of	settlement,	into	that	of	discussion	and	of	intelligence	is	to	treat	
those	who	disagree	–	even	profoundly	–	with	us	as	those	from	whom	we	may	learn,	in	so	far,	
as	friends.”33
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This	is	a	description	of	a	world	where	there	are	no	enemies!	Although	this	
thought	 is	 simple	and	already	present	 in	 the	New Testament	 (“The	Parable	
of	the	Good	Samaritan,”	Lk	10:25–37)	and	later	in	Nietzsche,34	it	is	far	from	
being	recognized	within	political	 theory.	Now	there	were	some	attempts	 to	
reconnect	the	ethical	and	the	political	in	the	recent	past:	clearly	Gandhi	comes	
to	one’s	mind	with	his	politics	of	swaraj,	i.e.	self-rule	based	on	absolute	non-
violence	and	truth	(ahimsa	and	satyagraha).	But	his	thought	consists	of	an	
internal	paradox:	it	is	violent	toward	oneself	(i.e.	his	ideal	of	chastity/auster-
ity)	 and	does	not	 affirm	 full	 autonomy	of	 the	human	being.	 In	 the	present	
age	Fred	Dallmayr,	for	example,	develops	Deweyan	democracy	as	a	promise	
and	Luce	Irigaray	develops	her	idiosyncratic	project	of	democratic	education,	
based	on	nonviolence.35	Needless	 to	 say,	 this	 thinking	 is	 experimental	 and	
needs	a	great	amount	of	 imagination,	 stemming	 from	 the	authonomous,	or	
“ethical”	subjectivity.	I	will	draw	on	these	aspects	to	present	a	possibility	for	
democratic	education	for	nonviolence.
We	 all	 know	 thinkers	 such	 as	 Chantal	Mouffe,	 Jacques	 Rancière,	 Ernesto	
Laclau,	Jean-Luc	Nancy,	Claude	Lefort	and	Jacques	Derrida	of	course	(and	
many	others),	showing	their	affinities	and	hopes	related	to	the	idea	of	demo-
28
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cracy	in	one	of	its	modalities,	and	testifying	to	the	role	of	difference	between	
‘the	political’	(le politique)	and	negatively	judged	‘politics’	(la politique).36	
But	in	order	to	return	to	democracy,	ethically,	and	to	take	seriously	the	path	
towards	a	future	culture	of	nonviolence,	more	is	needed	then	the	affirmation	
of	political	difference.	I	think	of	a	problematic	relation	between	subjectivity,	
inherited	from	the	tradition	of	Western	philosophy	with	political	philosophy	
included.	To	underpin	my	claim	I	will	only	mention	two	in	my	opinion	excel-
lent	observations:	Seyla	Benhabib	rightly	observes	that
“[p]ostmodernist	skepticism	toward	“really	existing	Western	democracies”	and	at	times	the	na-
ively	apologetic	confirmation	of	western	capitalism	and	democracy	by	their	new	aspirants	are	
contemporaries	of	our	current	political	and	cultural	horizon.…	[T]heorists	of	difference	have	
not	indicated	where	the	line	is	to	be	drawn	between	forms	of	difference	which	foster	democracy	
and	forms	of	difference	which	reflect	anti-democratic	aspirations.”37
For	her	it	is	essential	that	any	politics	of	difference	(or	of	the	“differend”)	stay	
within	the	democratic	horizon.	The	same	argument	is	presented	by	Stephen	
K.	White	as	follows:
“No	postmodern	thinkers	I	know	of	would	give	blanket	endorsement	to	the	explosions	of	vio-
lence	associated	with,	say,	the	resurgence	of	ethnic	group	nationalism	in	the	Soviet	Union	or	
with	the	growth	of	street	gangs	in	Los	Angeles.	And	yet	it	is	not	at	all	clear	that	they	have	a	
normative	discourse	available	to	condemn	such	violence.”38
It	is	important	to	note	the	intention	of	Benhabib	here:	she	knows	precisely	that	
dealing	with	political	philosophy	and	democracy	is	(ethically)	a	subtle	matter.	
It	is	something	that	is	deeply	associated	with	the	idea	of	‘humanity’	and	it	is	
much	less	important	which	theoretical	consequences	one	could	develop	from	
it.	What	I	mean	with	the	‘theoretical’	is	a	search	for	an	“originary	or	founda-
tional	political	act”39	or	some	other	metapolitical	act,	which	is	posited	instead	
of	a	search	for	 the	best	hopes	and	promises,	based	on	 the	ongoing	process	
and	tradition	of	emancipation	and	growth.	In	this	process	the	logic	of	subjec-
tivity	went	through	immense	changes	and	it	is	still	not	clear	if	our	Western	
democracies	and	political	traditions	have	fully	opened	the	plane	for	an	ethical	
subjectivity,	based	on	nonviolence.
Conclusion
I	would	like	to	sum	up	my	previous	arguments	and	propose	a	possible	path	
to	ethical	subjectivity,	based	on	my	previous	readings.	We	have	seen	that	it	
was	Levinas	who	 opened	 up	 the	 very	 possibility	 for	 an	 ethical	 recurrence	
of	the	other	–	as	a	Face	in	front	of	me	which	is	a	calling	out	to	me,	in	other	
words,	an	ethical	responsibility.	His	elaborations	on	the	body	are	also	crucial	
for	the	turn	toward	the	‘spiritual’	awakening	needed	in	our	times.	Not	to	be	
committed	 to	 the	body	 is	a	betrayal	 for	him.	 I	 think	 that	 the	 limit,	 that	we	
noticed	in	Levinas,	is	structurally	related	to	the	inherent	logic	of	his	thought:	
by	affirming	that	the	perpetrator	“no	longer	has	a	Face”	and	that	“[t]here	is	a	
certain	measure	of	violence	necessary	in	terms	of	justice,”40	he	testifies	to	an	
ethico-political	constellation	which	logically	still	dwells	in	the	vicinity	of	the	
ontological	 tradition	 and	 “nihilism.”	Levinas	 cannot	 suppress	 the	 “original	
sin”	of	our	civilization:	a	need	of	the	human	being	to	appropriate	the	other	in	
one	way	or	another.41	The	task	of	today	must	be	what	Irigaray	designates	as	a	
double	gesture	of	regrounding	singular	identity	and	regrounding	community	
constitution.42	This	double	task,	for	her,	requires	us	to	enter	a	path	of	shared	
becoming	of	which	the	result	can	only	be	love.	In	this	process,	the	relation	
is	grounded	on	 two	autonomous	persons	and	opposed	 to	Western	dialectic,	
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which	includes	the	logic	of	competition,	strength,	force	and	violence,	being	in	
its	entirety	the	testimony	for	“an	uncultivated	energy	that	society	is	no	longer	
able	to	channel	or	control.”43	This	is	a	return	to	the	culture	that	we	tragically	
forgot	for	centuries,	day	after	day.
One	may	only	hope	that	this	ethical	recurrence	will	predominate	in	the	future	
search	for	the	new	culture	of	democracy.
Lenart Škof
Dva povratka jedne ideje: 
O	političkim	i	etičkim	nestalnostima	demokracije
Prema politici nenasilja
Sažetak
U ovom radu razmatramo dvije različite kritike liberalne demokracije. Kroz analizu suvremene 
slovenske (radikalne) političke misli Slavoja Žižeka i nekih njegovih sljedbenika, koji u zadnje 
vrijeme revitaliziraju »ideju komunizma«, prvo ćemo kritički promisliti emancipacijski potenci-
jal ove struje suvremene slovenske filozofije. Interludij se fokusira na uporabe i logiku nasilja 
te se zalaže za novu političko-etičku kulturu nenasilja. U drugome dijelu rada, uzimajući u 
obzir Levinasovu etičku kritiku liberalne demokracije i fokusirajući se na njegov pojam različite 
vremenitosti unutar političke etike, razmotrit ćemo neke alternativne mogućnosti za budući 
napredak demokracije.
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Zweifache Wiederkehr einer Idee: 
über politische und ethische Unbeständigkeiten der Demokratie
In Richtung Politik der Gewaltlosigkeit
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Artikel besprechen wir zwei differente Kritikarten der liberalen Demokratie. Indem 
wir den kontemporären slowenischen (radikalen) politischen Gedanken Žižeks sowie einiger 
seiner Getreuen erörtern, die letztzeitlich die „Idee des Kommunismus“ revitalisieren, denken 
wir eingangs kritisch nach über das emanzipative Potenzial dieses Strangs der zeitgenössischen 
slowenischen Philosophie. Das Interludium richtet seine Aufmerksamkeit auf den Gebrauch 
bzw. die Logik der Gewalt und plädiert für eine neuartige politisch-ethische Kultur der Gewalt-
freiheit. In dem zweiten Teil des Papers – indem wir an Levinas’ ethischen Kritizismus gegen-
über der liberalen Demokratie herangehen und uns auf dessen Auffassung der andersgearteten 
Zeitlichkeit innerhalb der politischen Ethik fokussieren – prüfen wir einzelne Alternativmöglich-
keiten für den Zukunftsfortschritt der Demokratie.
Schlüsselwörter
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Deux retours d’une idée : 
sur les vicissitudes politiques et éthiques de la démocratie
Vers une politique de non-violence
Résumé
Dans cet article, nous examinons deux critiques différentes de la démocratie libérale. En ana-
lysant la pensée politique (radicale) slovène contemporaine de Slavoj Žižek et de certains de 
ces adeptes, qui ces derniers temps redonnent un nouveau souffle à « l’idée du communisme », 
nous allons d’abord réfléchir de manière critique sur le potentiel émancipatoire de ce courant 
de la philosophie slovène contemporaine. La partie intermédiaire se concentre sur l’emploi 
ainsi que sur la logique de la violence et plaide pour une nouvelle culture politico-éthique de 
non-violence. Dans la deuxième partie de cet article, nous allons discuter – en abordant la cri-
tique éthique par Levinas de la démocratie libérale et en nous concentrant sur sa notion d’une 
temporalité différente à l’intérieur de l’éthique politique – de quelques possibilités alternatives 
pour le progrès futur de la démocratie.
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